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Trade, Trade and Stratmgic Trade
Introduction:
My paper "Some International Elements of Perestroika and U.S. National Security" addressed only two of Gorbachev's goals for entering the international economy: securing increased investment from the West and obtaining membership in the international financial institutions (IFIs).
Gorbachev is counting on the third element --increased trade --as another way to ease the internal pressures in restructuring the Soviet economy. ~x~ This paper will support the principal conclusions of the companion paper: that perestroika, and evidence of its true nature, will take time to discover; that one of the threats of perestroika is the possibility of accentuating the split in the Western alliance; that the long-term goal of the U.S.
should be to integrate the Soviet Union into international society; and that the U.S. can use the time provided by the process of perestroika to evaluate the nature of Soviet change and proceed in a step-wise fashion. Also included are a few specific suggestions on what the U.S. can do to implement a step-by-step strategy. The second reason concerns the society in general and the military in particular and it spins off of the need for incentives to induce the populace to produce quality goods.
That production of quality products by the civilian economy is needed to provide some degree of confidence in the military that the civilian economy can meet military needs. Dean, p. 8 will have delivered 'reform' for the population and bought himself a decade within which to pursue deeper structural problems.
The conclusion of the Congressional Research Service report is that "While attainment of world levels of efficiency and quality may be beyond the USSR's early grasp, positive and significant change over time seems likely." (CRS-13)
The impact for U.S. security should be positive.
While an improved ability of the USSR to transform a highly productive, competitive civilian labor force into a war "f~machine is a latent consequence of reform, the integration These groups are to be self-financing so there should be an incentive to be profitable and efficient. 'the economic problems of the Soviet Union are only part of a much wider and more funadmental crisis of the Soviet system .... Western security requires a well-calibrated approach to economic contacts with the Soviet Union~ favoring a gradual solution of the complex of problems which the USSR is facing. Finding this solution is something which depends overwhelmingly on Soviet efforts. The West's main contribution will be cooperation --and normal commercial exchanges may be an important element here --in bringing about a less stressful international climate" (Feldbrugge, p. 21 Detente II needs to be based on the understanding that even though the two superpowers continue in an adversarial relationship, they are moving to establish an environment in which they can regulate and restrain their differences.
Secretary of State Baker said in the Washioqton post Feb. 22, 1989, that "the status of...legislative restrictions on Soviet trade is among the issues to be studied in the administration's review of East-West policies (which) ...will take about two months" (p. A20).
Moreover in an increasingly multipolar world where our interests and those of the countries of the EEC (or NATO~ are beginning to diverge, the U.S. needs to establish its policies and then move out to persuade it allies that it is in our mutual interest to 
